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Lions Over the Throne - The Judicial
Revolution in English Administrative
Law, by Bernard Schwartz, New York
and London: New York University Press,
1987 Pp. 210.
Reviewed by N. David Palmeter*
We learn more about our own laws when we undertake to
compare them with those of another sovereign. - Justice Sandra Day O'Connor'
In 1964, half a dozen years before Goldberg v. Kelly' began "a
due process explosion" 3 in the United States, Ridge v. Baldwin4 began a "natural justice explosion" in England. The story of this explosion - of this judicial revolution - is the story of the creation and
development by common law judges of a system of judicial supervision of administrative action that, in many ways, goes far beyond the
system presently prevailing in the United States. It is the story that
is told in this fascinating little book by Bernard Schwartz.
In his introduction, Professor Schwartz quotes an English writer
who in 1950 observed that American administrative law was much
more advanced than its English counterpart, and who was led to ask:
"Cannot Marshall Plan Aid include 'administrative law'?" '5 After
summarizing developments since Ridge v. Baldwin, Professor
Schwartz concludes his introduction with a request for "reverse
Marshall Plan Aid that includes administrative law."' One need not
go so far as to believe that American administrative law is in need of
assistance in order to be impressed by the developments in England
* A.B. Syracuse University, J.D. University of Chicago, Partner Mudge Rose Guthrie
Alexander & Ferdon, Washington, D.C.
1. O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in England and the United
States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 643, 667 (1986).
2. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
3. The words of Judge Henry Friendly in "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1267, 1268 (1975).
4. [1964] A.C. 40.
5. B. SCHWARTZ, LiONS OVER THE THRONE 1 (1987) citing Street, Book Review, 59
YALE L.J. 590, 593 (1950) [hereinafter Schwartz].
6. id. at 8.
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as recounted by Professor Schwartz.
The story is told through a collection of seven independent essays that discuss six English cases and one rule of procedure. The
topics covered are familiar to the American lawyer: the right to be
heard; statutory preclusion of review; procedure for obtaining review;
standing; scope of review; and privilege. The last topic treated, the
prerogative power, probably has no strict counterpart in the United
States and is perhaps best compared to the idea of Presidential authority. Each essay follows generally the same format: the English
decision is discussed (or, in the case of procedure for obtaining review, the court rule is discussed); the new development is placed in
the context of prior law; the United States doctrine on the subject is
described and compared; and subsequent developments are surveyed.
Ridge v. Baldwin, which started it all, does not strike an American lawyer as a particularly startling decision. A police officer, immediately after his acquittal on criminal charges, was dismissed
from his position without notice or opportunity to be heard. This
summary dismissal, the officer claimed, was a denial of "natural justice," the English counterpart of due process in the United States.
The lower courts did .not view the dismissal as a denial of natural
justice; rather, in conformity with a long line of authority, they
viewed it as an administrative act comparable to an initial appointment of the officer. This reasoning, Professor Schwartz relates, was
swept aside by the House of Lords which held that natural justice
requires notice of the charges and opportunity for hearing. A decision that a public employee may not be dismissed without a hearing
may well produce yawns among American lawyers, but the next step
of the judicial revolution in English administrative law, the 1969 decision in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission,7 will
cause the drowsy to sit up and take notice.
Anisminic involved the doctrine of statutory preclusion of judicial review. The statute establishing the Foreign Compensation
Commission provided: "The determination by the commission of any
application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in any court of law." 8 The commission in fact made a determination adverse to Anisminic's claim, and this determination was
called into question - and reversed - by a court of law. Professor
Schwartz describes this nullification of a restrictive enactment of
Parliament as "an unprecedented decision in a constitutional system
whose foundation stone is the principle of Parliamentary
supremacy." 9
7. [19691 2 A.C. 147.
8. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 46.
9. Id. at 45.
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The rationale of the unanimous House of Lords for the Anisminic decision collapsed a prior distinction between errors of law
that went to jurisdiction and those that did not. Anisminic expanded
the jurisdictional notion to include, in effect, any error of law, its
theory being that administrative agencies are established only to interpret a statute correctly - not incorrectly. If the agency makes an
error of law, it has done something the law did not authorize it to do,
and, therefore, has exceeded its powers. And, a court, certainly, may
proscribe an agency from exceeding its powers, even if it may not
review the proper exercise of those powers. Thus, Anisminic holds,
the determination of the agency is not reviewable provided, upon review, a court finds the agency's determination to be correct.
This reasoning has raised the eyebrow of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor who contrasted the "extreme resistance" to statutory preclusion of judicial review on the part of English courts with the
markedly different attitude of courts in the United States, as exemplified by her opinion, for a unanimous court, in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute.0 Justice O'Connor suggests that the difference in attitude may stem from differences in the constitutional roles
of courts in the British and American systems. Because the English
courts lack the power to declare acts of Parliament unlawful, she
suggests, they are confined to wielding their power to interpret the
law."
However, the judicial activism of the English courts, as exemplified in Anisminic, prompted a note of caution. Seeing Anisminic generally as pretense of interpretation in order to protect a judicial role,
Justice O'Connor has warned:
Pretense surely weakens the institutional authority of the
judiciary, and hence victories such as Anisminic may not come
without cost. The position of the English courts is inherently
precarious and although Parliament has not retaliated, it may be
unwise to infer impotence from accommodation."2
It is clear that Professor Schwartz is no devotee of judicial re10. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 648; 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
11.
Precisely because the role of the federal courts, and especially of the Supreme Court, rarely has been threatened in our history, and has a firm basis in a
written constitution, our courts may be more willing to engage in self-restraint.
Were the English courts to concede that an ouster clause wholly barred judicial
review of an administrative tribunal's decision, the courts would have no way of
preserving even a limited role if Parliament wished to give the tribunals a free
hand. It is thus ironic that our written constitution allows for more flexibility in
judicial interpretation of statutes precluding review, while the English courts are
driven to a rigid defense of their constitutional role notwithstanding the axiom
that Parliament is free to change that role by ordinary legislation.
O'Connor, supra note 1, at 656.
12. Id. at 655-56.
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straint in the style of Justice O'Connor. "On the contrary," he
writes, "the courts in this country tend too often to treat provisions
vesting power to act in the subjective judgment of the administrator
as conferring unreviewable discretionary authority."' 3
Judicial activism indeed is the theme that runs through the English administrative law developments, an activism of which Professor Schwartz heartily approves. Apart from Anisminic, this activism
is best illustrated by the book's chapter on standing, which deals
with the "The Fleet Street Casuals," part-time newspaper workers
who had deftly avoided the tax collector. 4 As part of a plan
designed to rectify the problem, the revenue authorities granted amnesty for past tax avoidance. This grant of amnesty outraged the
National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses, who
sought to have the amnesty declared unlawful. In reasoning worthy
of the "no-review of correct-determinations" holding in Anisminic,
the House of Lords, in effect, did away with the requirement of
standing by holding that courts first should decide the merits, and
then look at the question of standing, rather than the other way
around. If, on the merits, it were shown that the agency acted improperly, then a taxpayer would have standing to challenge the
agency, the Lords said. However, if the agency acted properly, the
Lords reasoned, there would be no legal interest to protect and,
hence, no standing.
Professor Schwartz remarks that "[t]he English judges have
displayed a more relaxed attitude toward standing than their federal
confreres in this country."' 5 So, indeed, it would appear. Allen v.
Wright,'6 another opinion by Justice O'Connor, highlights the understatement of Professor Schwartz's remark. There the Court denied
standing, observing that "an asserted right to have the Government
act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer
jurisdiction on a federal court.' 7 Professor Schwartz, on the other
hand, opposes "restrictive" rules on standing: "If a plaintiff with a
good case is turned away merely because he is not sufficiently affected personally, that means that some government agency is left
free to violate the law, and that is contrary to the public interest."' 8
Perhaps. But is it really in the public interest to have personal crusaders tying up agencies with challenges to every ruling with which
they take issue? It would be interesting to know if the English courts
13. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 63.
14. Regina v. Inland Revenue Commissioners: ex parte National Federation of SelfEmployed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617.
15. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 101.
16. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
17. 468 U.S. at 754.
18. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 114-15.
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have been able to avoid this problem.
The case described by Professor Schwartz as "the culmination
thus far of judicial activism in administrative law," 19 the "GCHQ"
case, 20 strikes a disharmonic chord for the American lawyer, for the
"holding" of the case is against the prevailing party. GCHQ, the
Government Communications Headquarters, is the agency responsible for the security of Britain's military and official communications.
In reaction to continuing labor difficulties at the agency, the government, without prior consultation, and despite an apparent requirement of prior consultation, barred the agency trade unions. The unions took the matter to court, contending that the rule was invalid
because of the government's failure to consult. Not so, said the government, for this was an exercise of the Crown's prerogative, a
power described by Blackstone as "that special pre-eminence which
the King hath, over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his legal dignity. ' 2 ' The
prerogative power is the power of the Crown qua Crown, the remainder of absolute monarchy.2 2 The House of Lords, Professor
Schwartz recounts, took a dim view of the idea of absolute prerogative power in a modern constitutional setting. One Lord likened the
notion to the "clanking of mediaeval chains." Thus, the Lords said,
the government's action was reviewable for, inter alia, procedural
impropriety.
But then, having found procedural impropriety, the Lords then
turned around and ruled for the government. They justified the decision on the basis of national security. Professor Schwartz quotes one
Lord as saying, "If no question of national security arose, the decision-making process in this case would have been unfair. ' 23 The
principles of fairness, of natural justice, gave way to the needs of
national security. But isn't this another way of saying that when the
chips are down, the government will have its way? Professor
Schwartz says no. "The GCHQ case," he writes, "can be summed up
as one in which the expanding law of judicial review may have lost
the immediate battle but went far toward winning the administrative
24
law war."
19. Id. at 178.
20. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, [1985] 1 A.C. 374.
21. Quoted in, Schwartz, supra note 5, at 184.
22. To speak of any remainder of absolute monarchy in the United States is an alien
notion, as demonstrated by the Steel Seizure Case cited by Professor Schwartz as the closest
U.S. counterpart. There, the Supreme Court through Justice Black rejected the notion of any
inherent power in the President, apart from that conferred by the Constitution and laws, at
least in areas where Congress can confer authority on the President. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
23. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 182.
24. Id. at 183.
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It may be true, as the author says, that the GCHQ case stands
for the proposition that the exercise of the prerogative power is as
subject to judicial review as the exercise of any other administrative
power, but the statements of the Lords seems to be more dicta than
holding. While they said the exercise of the prerogative is reviewable, they did not in fact review it other than to cry "national security." The holding would seem to be that the government may prohibit unions, without notice, if it believes the requirements of
national security so dictate."
Perhaps the lesson for the American reader lies in the differences in decisional style between the two countries. The English style
of oral opinions (whether or not delivered orally) leads to a very different tone from the American argumentative essay. In this context,
the statements in the GCHQ case may be seen as a shot across the
government's bow, warning that except in such obviously sensitive
areas as military and intelligence communications, the purported exercise of the prerogative power has seen its day."'
In his subtitle and throughout his book, Professor Schwartz uses
the term "English" rather than "British." Presumably this is to exclude Scotland with its separate legal system.2 7 Yet Scottish civil
cases from the Court of Session are appealed to the same House of
Lords responsible for the revolutionary decisions discussed by Professor Schwartz.2" The American reader is left to wonder if it would
have made a difference if Ridge, or Anisminic or GCHQ had arisen
in Scotland. A discussion of the implication of the judicial revolution
in English administrative law for Scotland would have been of
interest. 9
25. This contrasts sharply with a rather well-known "anti-prerogative" decision, United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), where the Supreme Court said that executive privilege
exists, but not in that instance; it held that the President was required to obey a subpoena
duces tecum issued by the Watergate Special Prosecutor. Archibald Cox relates how one European scholar protested: "It is unthinkable that the courts of any country should issue an
order to its Chief of State." A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION, 7 (1987). To an
American, it is more unthinkable that a court should not do so.
26. Professor Schwartz is not alone in seeing review of prerogative power as the holding
of the GCHQ case: "The House of Lords ... boldly discarded the constraints of settled law,
with three of their Lordships (Diplock, Scarman and Roskill) holding that, as with the exercise of statutory powers, the exercise of the prerogative is in principle subject to judicial review." Ewing, Case and Comment, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1 (1985) (emphasis added).
27. Strictly speaking, English law applies only in England and Wales. "The expression
'British Law' cannot therefore be used." R. DAVID AND J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS
IN THE WORLD TODAY 259 (1968).
28. D. WALKER, THE ScoTTIsH LEGAL SYSTEM 128, 141, 256-58 (1981).
29. When the House of Lords sits in Scottish appeals, it sits as a Scottish court, and
normally would not consider itself bound by its decisions in English appeals. But decisions in
English appeals on statutes common to both England an Scotland "are probably binding."
Walker, supra note 27, at 372. Decisions "on grounds of general jurisprudence raised in nonScottish appeals are persuasive only, though in a high degree." Id. at 373. The same writer
elsewhere implies, somewhat ruefully, that perhaps the term "British" would have been
appropriate:
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Another item missing from the book is a conclusion. To be sure,
Professor Schwartz sets the scene with a ten page introduction, but
after that each separate essay stands on its own. The book simply
ends with the GCHQ chapter. A final chapter commenting on the
relationships among these developments would have been welcome.
But these are complaints of omission, not of commission, and
they raise another notable feature of this volume: its readability.
Professor Schwartz tells a good story, and when he is finished, the
reader is not really ready for it to end. Like so much of the professional reading that piles up on our desks, Lions Over the Throne can
be read with profit; unlike so much of that professional reading, however, this little volume can be read with pleasure as well.

Increasingly . . . the Parliamentary imposition of the same rules on Scotland as on England and the tendency to assimilate the rules of the two jurisdictions has led to steadily increasing reference in Scotland to English books, which
frequently ignore Scottish decisions and specialties of Scots law. The same reasons have frequently made it not worth while for a Scottish writer to seek to
write a distinctively Scottish book on a theme, such as company law or carriage
or employment or shipping, where the law is largely common to the two systems
and the majority of the cases are English. The same reasons have led to steadily
increased citation of English cases in Scottish courts, frequently without adequate appreciation of the different background from which those English cases
emerged, and the different context, historical, doctrinal and procedural in which
they were decided.
D. WALKER, THE SCOTTISH JURISTS 421-22 (1985).

